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 “Foreclosure mills,” as the term has been coined by lawyers who often represent 
homeowners, are law firms and service companies that manage loan default and 
foreclosure cases for lenders and servicers.1  Recently, foreclosure mills have come 
under increased scrutiny because of the number of cases they take and the fees they 
charge.2  These companies are often paid based on the number of completed cases 
they process, leading many to cut corners in default cases.  As a result, foreclosure 
actions are often initiated before the lender has properly compiled and completed all 
necessary paperwork.3  Foreclosure companies charge fees that are often used to 
generate necessary revenue in foreclosures, but the legitimacy of these fees has been 
called into question.4  Similar to the fees charged by foreclosure mills, loan origination 
and servicing fees provide a comparably important source of income for mortgage 
lenders.5  In 1974, in response to concern about excessive fees being charged to 
mortgage applicants, Congress passed the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(“RESPA”).6  While recognizing that some fees are legitimate, RESPA eliminates 
kickbacks and referral fees that unnecessarily increase the costs of loans but leaves 
untouched other justifiable fees associated with mortgages.7
 In Cohen v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., the Second Circuit found, in direct opposition 
to decisions by other circuit courts, that certain fees not specifically enumerated in 
RESPA were nonetheless prohibited.8  In Cohen, the issue was whether the language 
in RESPA section 8(b)9 prohibits the collection by a single mortgage provider of fees 
1. See Gretchen Morgenson & Jonathan D. Glater, Foreclosure Machine Thrives on Woes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
30, 2008, at BU1 [hereinafter Foreclosure Machine].
2. See generally Amir Efrati, Judges Tackle ‘Foreclosure Mills’, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 2007, at B6; Foreclosure 
Machine, supra note 1; Gretchen Morgenson, Fighting for a Home, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2008, at C1 
[hereinafter Fighting].
3. See Foreclosure Machine, supra note 1.  When loans have been sold many times, or packaged into 
securitization trusts, it can be unclear who the actual holder of the promissory note may be.  The entity 
filing the foreclosure suit must be the holder of the loan; suits have been dismissed by judges when the 
plaintiff could not show it had the right to foreclose.  See Efrati, supra note 2; Foreclosure Machine, supra 
note 1; Fighting, supra note 2. 
4. See Foreclosure Machine, supra note 1.  The estimated income generated by foreclosure service companies 
is staggering—possibly as much as $11.6 million per year by one Texan firm.  Defaulting borrowers 
often rely upon the lenders’ calculations and do not question the validity of these fees.  Id.
5. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market a Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 
39 Sw. L.J. 991, 1016 (1989).
6. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).  In the early 1970s, a joint study 
undertaken by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Administrator of Veterans 
Affairs brought to the limelight abusive practices in the mortgage settlement process that resulted in 
higher settlement costs to borrowers.  Because most home buyers did not understand the settlement 
process and its related costs, lenders were charging fees without providing any benefit to the borrower 
and borrowers were unable to shop around for lower settlement costs.  See S. Rep. No. 93-866 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546.
7. See Boulware v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 291 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2002).
8. 498 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2007).  In its opinion, the Second Circuit considered and rejected the opinions of 
the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.  Id. at 115; see also Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832 
(8th Cir. 2003); Boulware, 291 F.3d 261; Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2002).
9. See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act § 2607(b).  RESPA section 8(b) is part of section 2607, 
which is titled “Prohibition against kickbacks and unearned fees.”
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for which no services were rendered, or whether the statute only prohibits the 
collection of such fees when they are divided between two or more entities.10  RESPA 
section 8(b) states:
Splitting charges—No person shall give and no person shall accept any 
portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering 
of a real estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a 
federally related mortgage loan other than for services actually performed.
The Second Circuit concluded that RESPA section 8(b) strictly prohibits all unearned 
fees even when they are not split with a third party.11  This case comment contends 
that the Second Circuit improperly disregarded precedent, found ambiguity where 
none exists, and improperly deferred to the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s (“HUD”) interpretation of RESPA section 8(b).12  The plain language 
of the statute clearly indicates Congress’s intent that, in order to constitute a violation 
of RESPA section 8(b), unearned fees must be split between two or more mortgage 
lenders.
 Plaintiff Sylvia Cohen (“Cohen”) refinanced her residential mortgage loan with 
defendants JPMorgan Chase & Co. and JPMorgan Chase Bank (collectively, 
“Chase”) in September 2003.13  The settlement statement provided at closing by 
Chase included numerous fees for services rendered in connection with the 
refinancing.14  Included in these fees was a $225 fee labeled only as a “post-closing 
fee” on the settlement statement.15  At the closing in September, the defendant did 
10. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 115.  Prior to Congress’s passage of RESPA, abusive practices were common in the 
lending process, resulting often in unnecessarily high closing costs.  One such practice included 
kickbacks and referral fees that were shared between service providers in mortgage loan transactions. 
Because borrowers were not provided with timely and complete information regarding the nature of 
closing costs, they were unable to shop the market for more affordable mortgage services.  Congress’s 
intent in passing RESPA was to inform and protect consumers involved in the settlement process for 
residential real estate.  See 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006); S. Rep. No. 93-866 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546.
11. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 124–25.
12. HUD, a federal agency created by the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, is 
responsible for national policy and programs addressing the country’s housing and urban development 
needs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (2006).  Under RESPA, the Secretary of HUD is given the power to make 
any interpretations necessary to achieve the purposes of the statute.  12. U.S.C. § 2617 (2006).  As such, 
on October 18, 2001, HUD issued a statement (the “Policy Statement”) regarding its interpretation of 
RESPA section 8(b).  In its Policy Statement, HUD declared that its long-standing interpretation of the 
prohibitions in section 8(b) is that a single settlement service provider, by charging the borrower a fee 
for which no services are provided and not splitting such fee with any other entity or person, violates the 
provisions of RESPA section 8(b) because the RESPA regulations simply prohibit the charging of 
unearned fees.  See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of 
Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance 
Concerning Unearned Fees under section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53052–01 (Oct. 18, 2001).
13. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 113.
14. Id. at 114.
15. Id.
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not disclose the purpose of the fee, except that it was for future services.16  Cohen 
and the defendant disagreed as to whether any services were provided for this fee.17 
Cohen later learned that the fee was collected by defendant to offset the future costs 
of repackaging Cohen’s mortgage loan with other mortgage loans to be sold on the 
secondary market.18
 Cohen filed a claim against Chase on September 22, 2004 on behalf of both 
herself and a putative class of persons who had also paid similar closing fees for 
which they claimed no services were rendered.19  In her suit, Cohen alleged, inter 
alia, that Chase had violated section 8(b) of RESPA by charging the post-closing fee 
without providing any related services.20  Chase filed a motion to dismiss21 and the 
district court granted the defendant’s motion for failure to state a claim of a violation 
under RESPA section 8(b).22  Relying on Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,23 
the court held that the post-closing fee paid by Cohen was a “quintessential 
overcharge” assessed for no service at all and, as an overcharge, was not prohibited 
under RESPA section 8(b).24
 In Kruse, the Second Circuit considered whether “overcharges” (charges that 
arise out of services provided by the lender but that are considerably higher than the 
actual cost to the lender) violated RESPA section 8(b) when they were paid to a 
single service provider as opposed to being split among more than one.25  After 
considering both the meaning of the statute and HUD’s Policy Statement, the court 
in Kruse held that RESPA section 8(b) does not apply to overcharges paid to a single 
lender.26  The trial court in Cohen concluded that Kruse was controlling precedent 
16. See Cohen v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. CV-04-4098, 2006 WL 20596, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 
2006).
17. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 114.
18. Cohen, 2006 WL 20596, at *3.
19. See Cohen, 498 F.3d at 114.
20. See id. at 113.
21. See Cohen, 2006 WL 20596, at *1.  See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
govern the procedure of all civil suits pending in the United States District Courts.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
Rule 12 sets out a number of defenses that are available in every civil suit.  In the present case, defendant 
Chase made a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.  Under this rule, if a plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of a claim which 
warrants the granting of relief, the case cannot be heard or considered by the court and must be 
dismissed.  See id.; 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1356 (3d ed. 2008).
22. Cohen, 2006 WL 20596, at *1.
23. 383 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2004).
24. Cohen v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. CV-04-4098, 2005 WL 5870856, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2005).
25. See Kruse, 383 F.3d at 55–56.
26. Id. at 56.  The HUD Policy Statement proclaimed that charging unreasonably high prices for services 
provided is prohibited by RESPA section 8(b).  The Kruse court rejected this interpretation because the 
statutory language does not authorize courts to determine what portion of a charge is reasonable and 
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and the post-closing fee was a “quintessential overcharge” because it was paid in 
exchange for no services.27  The court in Cohen also refused to give Chevron deference 
to HUD’s Policy Statement, concluding that the language of RESPA is unambiguous 
with respect to its requirement of a third party.28  On January 4, 2006, the district 
court denied Cohen’s motion for reconsideration and, as a result, dismissed Cohen’s 
claim.29
 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed 
Cohen’s claim under RESPA section 8(b) de novo.30  The court distinguished Kruse, 
determined that RESPA section 8(b) is ambiguous, and finally, gave deference to the 
HUD interpretation of the statute as contained in its Policy Statement.31  Based on 
this analysis, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.32
 The Second Circuit distinguished Kruse by classifying the overcharges in Kruse 
and the unearned fees in Cohen as two distinct types of charges.33  It also determined 
what portion is unreasonable; the court determined that the statute “clearly and unambiguously” did not 
apply to overcharges.  Id.
27. Cohen, 2006 WL 20596, at *2.
28. Id.  In its Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) opinion, 
the United States Supreme Court laid out the rules for when a court must defer to an agency interpretation 
of a congressional statute.  See id. at 842–44.  If the plain language of the statute or the intent of 
Congress when passing the statute is clear, a court must construe such statute accordingly.  The Court, 
being the final authority on statutory construction, may reject an agency interpretation in this situation. 
However, if the plain language or the intent of the statute is unclear and ambiguous, the court must 
consider whether the agency’s interpretation of such is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”  The agency’s interpretation does not necessarily have to be the only plausible interpretation 
that could have been adopted.  Id.  This deference to an agency interpretation has been termed “Chevron 
deference” and the corresponding analysis of the statute has been termed “Chevron analysis” by both the 
trial court and the court of appeals in Cohen and will be discussed in more detail later in this case 
comment.
29. Cohen, 2006 WL 20596, at *1.
30. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 114.  The issue on appeal was based entirely on a question of law for two reasons—
the dismissal was granted by the trial court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the central question 
in the case is one of statutory interpretation.  Id. at 114–15.  Trial court decisions based on questions of 
law are not given deference on appeal and are reviewed de novo.  See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 
U.S. 552, 558–59 (1988) (stating the proposition that a judicial decision based on a question of law is 
reviewable de novo by a higher court).
31. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 113.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 115.  The court in Kruse considered the meaning of RESPA section 8(b) in connection with 
markups and overcharges.  Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53.  According to the Kruse court, overcharges included 
charges for services provided by a lender that were increased to a cost substantially higher than the 
actual cost to such lender.  Id.  Markups were defined by the court as when a lender outsources a service 
in connection with the mortgage loan and subsequently charges the borrower a higher fee than the 
actual cost.  Id.  In Kruse, the plaintiffs had allegedly paid markups and overcharges to a single settlement 
service provider in connection with their residential mortgage loans.  Id.  The Second Circuit looked at 
both the plain language of the statute and the legislative history of the bill and concluded that, with 
respect to overcharges, it was clear that RESPA section 8(b) was not meant to be a “price-control 
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that Cohen’s claim did not rely on the same Policy Statement provisions that were 
considered in Kruse.34  Cohen argued that the Kruse decision effectively established 
that lenders are prohibited from charging unearned fees,35 while Chase, on the other 
hand, argued that Kruse prohibited markups because the “piggy-back[ing] [of] an 
unearned fee onto the charge of a third-party service provider . . . effectively 
constitutes a divided charge.”36  The Second Circuit, however, rejected both of these 
arguments.  The court instead declared that the holding in Kruse (that RESPA 
section 8(b) is not a price control statute) does not apply to the issue of whether 
section 8(b) only prohibits unearned fees when such fees are shared among more 
than one lender or service provider.37
 The next step in the Second Circuit’s reasoning was to consider the deference 
rule set out in Chevron.38  Applying what it termed the “Chevron analysis” to RESPA 
section 8(b), the court first looked to whether Congress’s intent was clearly set forth 
in the statutory text of RESPA.39  Under Chevron, if the statutory text can plausibly 
be interpreted in multiple divergent ways, the language is considered ambiguous and 
unclear.40  In the instant case, the Second Circuit analyzed the RESPA section 8(b) 
statutory phrase “any portion, split or percentage of any charge.”41  The court reached 
one plausible interpretation of the phrase by reference to the dictionary definitions of 
mechanism” and as such, deference to HUD’s Policy Statement was not required.  Id. at 57.  The Kruse 
court also determined that the language of and the Congressional intent behind RESPA Section 8(b) 
were ambiguous with respect to markups.  Id. at 58.  However, when the Kruse court considered the 
HUD Policy Statement with respect to markups, it determined that deference was due.  Id. at 61.  By 
application of the Policy Statement, the court in Kruse held that lenders could not mark up their 
settlement fees for services provided by third-party vendors.  Id. at 62.
34. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 115.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 116.
38. Id.  Chevron was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1984.  The issue before the Court was 
whether the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated a reasonable construction of an ambiguous 
term contained in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.  Central to the 
decision in Chevron was the interpretation of the statutory term “stationary source.”  Id.  This term was 
not explicitly defined in the relevant part of the statute and was not clearly addressed in the legislative 
history of the statute.  Id. at 841.  Because of this ambiguity, the Court turned to an existing 
administrative interpretation, stating that a court may only impose its own construction on a statute in 
the absence of such an administrative interpretation.  Id. at 843.  In order to rely on an administrative 
interpretation of a statute, a court must decide whether such interpretation is based on a “permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id.  According to the Court, while the judiciary should give considerable 
weight to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is entrusted to administer, it must rely on such an 
interpretation only if the interpretation at issue is not clearly contrary to Congress’s intent in passing the 
statute.  Id. at 843 n.9.  The Court noted that the agency interpretation does not need to be the only 
possible construction of the statute.  Id. at 843 n.11.
39. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 116.
40. Id. at 117.
41. Id.
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“portion,” “split,” and “percentage.”42  Each of the definitions considered by the court 
described the terms as something that is divided and less than whole, resulting in the 
court’s conclusion that the use of the three terms together in RESPA section 8(b) 
could signal a prohibition only of divided unearned fees.43  
 The Second Circuit next evaluated the phrase “portion, split, or percentage” in 
conjunction with the surrounding words of section 8(b), focusing on Congress’s 
inclusion of the word “any.”44  Looking to interpretations of other statutes in various 
cases, the court concluded that the use of “any” as a modifier tends to mean that 
Congress intended the statute to be interpreted broadly.45  While Congress’s inclusion 
of the words “portion, split, or percentage” could indicate a reference to a divided fee, 
the court determined that the word “any” expanded the reach of this phrase to include 
whole fees as well.46  Because the court was able to reach multiple interpretations of 
the statutory text, it concluded that the text of RESPA section 8(b) was ambiguous 
and further investigation into the statutory meaning was warranted.47
 In the next step of the Chevron analysis, the Second Circuit analyzed RESPA’s 
congressional history and reasoned that it did not clearly establish Congress’s intent.48 
After deciding that the structure, purpose, and legislative history provided no clues 
to resolve the textual ambiguity, the court turned to HUD’s interpretation as set 
forth in the Policy Statement.49  The court held that the Policy Statement reasonably 
interprets RESPA section 8(b) as prohibiting all unearned fees, whether held by a 
single lender or split among multiple entities.50  The court therefore adopted HUD’s 
interpretation as controlling in this case because there was no evidence that Congress 
specifically rejected this interpretation.51  The Second Circuit subsequently remanded 
Cohen’s claim for further proceedings.52
42. Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1768 (2002)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 117–18.  Other cases weighed by the Second Circuit included United States v. Gonzales, 520 
U.S. 1 (1997) (holding that the word “any” has an expansive meaning); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007) (holding that the repeated use of the word “any” expanded the statutory language to include 
all airborne compounds); and Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
Congress expanded statutory language when the word “any” preceded a list).  Id.
46. Id. at 120.
47. See id. at 119.
48. See id. at 121; S. Rep. No. 93-866 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546.  The Senate report 
discusses the intent of the RESPA section at issue and articulates such intent as “prohibit[ing] a company 
. . . that renders a settlement service from giving or rebating any portion of the charge to any other 
person except in return for the services actually performed.”  S. Rep. No. 93-866, at 6551.
49. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 124–25.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 125–26.
52. Id. at 127.
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 The Second Circuit’s conclusion in Cohen is erroneous for a number of reasons. 
The court not only rejected the trial court’s application of precedent but also came to 
a conclusion clearly at odds with a number of other circuit courts, which have all held 
that an unearned fee is a violation of the statute only when such fee is split between 
at least two lenders or settlement providers.53  The court misinterpreted both the 
plain language of RESPA section 8(b) and the legislative intent behind the statute. 
In misapplying Chevron, the court in Cohen deferred to the HUD Policy Statement 
in a situation where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.  Under Cohen, 
a residential mortgage borrower in the Second Circuit can now bring a claim against 
a single mortgage lender or mortgage service provider in connection with any 
unearned fee charged at closing.54
 The court acknowledged in its opinion that its rejection of a statutory 
interpretation requiring both a culpable giver and a culpable receiver sharing an 
unearned fee is at odds with past decisions of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth 
Circuits.55  In Boulware v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., the Fourth Circuit considered 
the meaning of RESPA section 8(b) with respect to alleged overcharges by the 
defendant.56  The court in Boulware found it unnecessary to look past the plain 
language of the statute.  It held that, while RESPA section 8(b) applies to an 
overcharge or an unearned fee, it was intended to prohibit only the sharing of such 
fees rather than a “unilateral overcharge” by a single lender.57  The court explained its 
holding by addressing the phrase “no person shall give and no person shall accept” in 
RESPA section 8(b), which, according to the court, makes no logical sense absent a 
fee-splitting situation.58  Without two or more lenders splitting the fee, this phrase 
would necessarily have to include the borrower as either a culpable giver or receiver, 
and Congress did not intend to make consumers potentially liable under the provisions 
of a statute designed to protect them.59
 The Seventh Circuit considered a similar issue in Krzalic v. Republic Title Co.60 
In Krzalic, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of RESPA section 8(b) because the 
53. See id. at 115; Boulware, 291 F.3d 261; Haug, 317 F.3d 832; Krzalic, 314 F.3d 875.  The courts in each of 
these three cases held that RESPA section 8(b) applies only when an unearned fee is split between two 
or more entities.
54. See Cohen, 498 F.3d at 126.
55. Id. at 115.  The court does not support this rejection with clear legal analysis.  As discussed in detail 
herein, the court correctly states that statutory construction requires analysis of the entire provision as a 
whole, yet then refuses to consider the interpretive value of the phrase “no person shall give and no 
person shall accept” in relation to the remainder of the statutory provision.  Id.
56. See Boulware, 291 F.3d 261.  In Boulware, the defendant purchased a copy of the plaintiff ’s credit report 
from a third party.  Plaintiff alleged that the defendant charged her at least $50 over the cost of the 
report, but did not allege that any portion of such overcharge was paid to the credit reporting agency or 
any other third party.  Id. at 264.
57. Id. at 265.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Krzalic, 314 F.3d 875.
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defendant charged them $50 for recording their mortgage when the recording in fact 
only cost the defendant $36.61  The court in Krzalic refused to consider the Policy 
Statement because the RESPA provision is clear on its face.62  The court determined 
the plain language of RESPA section 8(b) applies only in “a situation in which A 
charges B (the borrower) a fee of some sort, collects it, and then either splits it with 
C or gives C a portion or percentage . . . of it.”63
 The Eighth Circuit also looked at the meaning of RESPA section 8(b) in 
connection with overcharges in Haug v. Bank of America.64  The issue in Haug was 
whether overcharges paid by the plaintiff in connection with her mortgage loan 
constituted a violation of RESPA section 8(b) notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant did not share such fees with a third party.65  The court looked at the 
statutory language to determine the existence of ambiguities and found without 
question that section 8(b) is “an anti-kickback provision that unambiguously requires 
at least two parties to share a settlement fee in order to violate the statute.”66  Because 
the statutory language was clear on its face, the court refused to apply a Chevron 
analysis and gave no weight to the HUD Policy Statement.67
 RESPA was enacted by Congress in 1974 to protect borrowers from “unnecessarily 
high settlement charges” and to eliminate fees that unnecessarily increase the costs 
of settlement services.68  The language of section 8(b) specifically prohibits the 
sharing of any “portion, split, or percentage of any charge” for which no services were 
rendered to the borrower.69  A review of the legislative materials and history of this 
statute reveals that this section of RESPA was passed in response to a development 
in the lending industry of paying unearned fees to “persons who [were] in a position 
to refer settlement business” as a means of securing future transactions and referrals, 
thus increasing the settlement costs to the borrower without providing any additional 
benefits.70  The court’s decision in Cohen stands alone with regard to whether the 
61. See id. at 877.
62. See generally id. (stating that when statutory meaning is clear, the court must preserve the legislature’s 
language and may not impose its own interpretation of the statute).
63. Id. at 879.  The court went on to discuss whether the Policy Statement warranted Chevron analysis, but 
as the court had already decided that statutory language was clear and unambiguous, this discussion was 
not relevant to the court’s holding.  Id.
64. See Haug, 317 F.3d 832.
65. See id. at 835.
66. Id. at 836.
67. See id. at 840.
68. Cohen, 498 F.3d at 122.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2006).
70. See S. Rep. No. 93-866 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6546, 6551.  The legislature also 
intended RESPA to lower the costs of the settlement process for borrowers by requiring earlier disclosure 
of settlement fees, allowing a borrower to “shop around” for the lowest possible settlement costs.   
S. Rep. No. 93-866, at 6548.
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provision applies to a single lender charging an unearned fee and is contrary to the 
legislative history.
 The Cohen court reached its conclusion by focusing on Congress’s twofold use of 
a single word—“any.”71  After evaluating the phrase “portion, split, or percentage,” 
the court noted that these terms are commonly used to refer to things that have been 
divided between at least two entities or people.72  The court concluded that the 
addition of the word “any” could reasonably be viewed as an expansion of the statutory 
language to include undivided unearned fees.73  Yet even though the court correctly 
stated that the words of the statute must be evaluated in light of the entire statutory 
language, the court did not consider the meaning of the immediately preceding 
phrase “no person shall give and no person shall accept.”74  The court merely stated 
that Kruse had rejected an interpretation that required at least two culpable parties.75 
But a careful reading of Kruse shows that the court did not clearly reject this 
construction.  The Kruse court determined that, with respect to overcharges, the 
words of the statute are not ambiguous and two culpable parties are required before 
a violation can exist under section 8(b).76  Only with respect to markups did the 
Kruse court decide that the words of the statute were ambiguous.77  With respect to 
markups only, the Kruse court chose to defer to the HUD Policy Statement as a 
definitive interpretive source.78  The Cohen court, therefore, incorrectly found that 
Kruse rejected a construction requiring two culpable parties.  Had the Cohen court 
considered section 8(b) as a whole, it would have been clear to the court that the 
statute unambiguously refers only to unearned fees which are divided among at least 
two parties.
 The phrase “no person shall give and no person shall accept” has been evaluated 
by a number of different courts in connection with similar issues, and they have all 
held that RESPA section 8(b) prohibits the splitting of a fee between two or more 
71. See Cohen, 498 F.3d at 117.  The Second Circuit claimed to evaluate the statutory language as a whole, 
yet gave no weight to the phrase “[n]o person shall give and no person shall accept . . . .”  This portion 
of the statute was dismissed by the court with very little discussion.  Id. at 120.
72. Id. at 117.
73. See id. at 117–18.
74. See id. at 120.  The Second Circuit did not consider the entire statute even though it clearly stated that 
“statutory language must be read in context since a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it.” 
Id. at 117 (citing General Dynamics Land Sys. Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004)).
75. See id. at 120.
76. See Kruse, 383 F.3d at 56.
77. See id. at 58.  Under Kruse, an overcharge is the amount by which the charge for a service provided by 
the lender exceeds what is reasonable for that service.  Id. at 56.  A markup, on the other hand, is a fee 
charged by the lender for services provided by a third party vendor, but increased over the lender’s actual 
cost, resulting in profit for the lender.  Id. at 57.
78. See id. at 59.
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parties if it was collected absent performance of actual services for such fee.79  In 
Boulware, the Fourth Circuit provided a clear and helpful analogy to explain how 
this phase applies to an exchange between two or more entities rather than a unilateral 
act.80  The court illustrated that if the provision applied to a fee charged by a single 
lender, then the borrower herself would be the only party left in the transaction who 
could be the giver referenced in the statute.81  In light of the fact that the statute was 
intended to protect consumers, it would be illogical that the consumer could be 
considered the giver and hence be potentially liable for the civil penalties and criminal 
sanctions authorized under RESPA section 8(b).82  The plaintiff and HUD (as 
amicus curiae) argued unsuccessfully before the Boulware court that the government 
would not prosecute the consumers it was trying to protect and could not provide 
proof that the government is bound by such a promise.83
 Finally, it is important to note that the court in Cohen mistakenly claimed to be 
interpreting RESPA section 8(b) in the same way the Eleventh Circuit did in Sosa v. 
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.84  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s contention, the 
court in Sosa did not hold that RESPA section 8(b) can apply where there is an 
unearned fee charged by a single lender.85  In fact, the Sosa court dismissed the 
plaintiff ’s case for failure to state a claim because the plaintiff was unable to show 
that the fee paid was absent services rendered by the defendant.86  According to the 
court, the portion of a charge did not have to be both given and taken, and therefore, 
RESPA section 8(b) could apply to situations where there was only one culpable 
party.87  It is important to note, however, that this discussion did not constitute the 
holding of the court as the case was dismissed on other grounds.  The analysis by the 
court in Sosa constitutes nothing more than dictum.
 Considered in light of the foregoing, it is evident that the provisions of RESPA 
section 8(b) are not violated in a situation, like the one in Cohen, where only one 
lender is involved.  RESPA section 8(b) is clear and unambiguous on its face. 
Statutory construction by the Second Circuit should have gone no further than to 
read the statute and interpret the plain meaning of its words.  A full discussion under 
79. See generally Boulware, 291 F.3d 261; Haug, 317 F.3d 832; Krzalic, 314 F.3d 875.  The disputed fees in 
each of these cases involved either an overcharge or a markup for services rendered, while the fee in the 
instant case is alleged to be an unearned fee for no services rendered.  This distinction, however, is 
irrelevant in interpreting the statute.  In each case, the main concern is that a fee, whether the whole or 
a portion, was paid by a borrower for no additional services rendered.
80. See Boulware, 291 F.3d at 265–66.
81. See id. at 265.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Cohen, 498 F.3d at 115 (discussing the decision in Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 348 
F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2003)).
85. See generally Sosa, 348 F.3d 979.
86. Id. at 984.
87. Id. at 982.
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the Chevron analysis was unnecessary and unwarranted.  The court is the final 
authority on statutory construction, and because the plain meaning of the words of 
the statute are clear, the HUD Policy Statement should not have been adopted by the 
Second Circuit.
